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Abstract
Topos theory has been suggested by Do¨ring and Isham as an alternative mathematical structure
with which to formulate physical theories. In particular it has been used to reformulate standard
quantum mechanics in such a way that a novel type of logic is used to represent propositions. In
this paper we extend this formulation to include temporally-ordered collections of propositions as
opposed to single-time propositions. That is to say, we have developed a quantum history formalism
in the language of topos theory where truth values can be assigned to temporal propositions. We
analyse the extent to which such truth values can be derived from the truth values of the constituent,
single-time propositions.
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my life
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1 Introduction
Consistent-history quantum theory was developed as an attempt to deal with closed systems in quantum
mechanics. Some such innovation is needed since the standard Copenhagen interpretation is incapable
of describing the universe as a whole, since the existence of an external observer is required.
Griffiths,[16], [21] Omn‘es [18], [19], [20], [17] and Gell-Mann and Hartle [13], [15], [14] approached
this problem by proposing a new way of looking at quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, in
which the fundamental objects are ‘consistent’ sets of histories. Using this approach it is then possible
to make sense of the Copenhagen concept of probabilities even though no external observer is present.
A key facet of this approach is that it is possible to assign probabilities to history propositions rather
than just to propositions at a single time.
The possibility of making such an assignment rests on the so-called decoherence functional (see
Section 2) which is a complex-valued functional, d : UP × UP → C, where UP is the space of history
propositions. Roughly speaking, the decoherence functional selects those sets of histories whose elements
do not ‘interfere’ with each other pairwise (i.e., pairs of histories α, β, such that d(α, β) = 0 if α 6= β).
A set C = {α, β, · · · , γ} of history propositions is said to be consistent if C is complete1 and d(α, β) = 0
for all pairs of nonequal histories in C. Given a consistent set C, the value d(α, α) for any α ∈ C is
interpreted as the probability of the history α being realized. This set can be viewed ‘classically’ in so
far as the logic of such a set is necessarily Boolean.
Although this approach overcomes many conceptual problems related to applying the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics to a closed system, there is still the problem of how to deal with
the plethora of different consistent sets of histories. In fact a typical decoherence functional will give
rise to many consistent sets, some of which are incompatible each other in the sense that they cannot be
joined to form a larger set.
In the literature, two main ways have been suggested for dealing with this problem, the first of
which is to try and select a particular set which is realized in the physical world because of some sort of
physical criteria. An attempt along these lines was put forward by Gell-Mann and Hartle in [13] where
they postulated the existence of a measure of the quasi-classicality of a consistent set, and which, they
argued, is sharply peaked.
A different approach is to accept the plethora of consistent sets and interpret them in some sort of
many-world view. This was done by Isham in [23]. The novelty of his approach is that, by using a
different mathematical structure, namely ‘topos theory’, he was able to give a rigorous mathematical
definition of the concept of many worlds. In particular, he exploited the mathematical structure of the
collection of all complete sets of history propositions to construct a logic that can be used to interpret
the probabilistic predictions of the theory when all consistent sets are taken into account simultaneously,
i.e., a many-worlds viewpoint.
The logic so defined has the particular feature that
1. It is manifestly ‘contextual’ in regard to complete sets of propositions (not necessarily consistent).
2. It is multi-valued (i.e., the set of truth values is larger than just {true, false}).
3. In sharp distinction from standard quantum logic, it is distributive.
Using this new, topos-based, logic Isham assigned generalised truth values to the probability of
realizing a given history proposition. These type of propositions are called ‘second level’ and are of the
form “the probability of a history α being true is p”. In defining these truth values Isham makes use
of the notion of a ‘d-consistent Boolean algebras W d’, which are the algebras associated with consistent
sets. The philosophy of his approach, therefore, was to translate into the language of topos theory the
existing formalism of consistent histories, but in such a way that all consistent sets are considered at
once.
1A set C = {α, β, · · · , γ} is said to be complete if all history are pair-wise disjoint and their logical ‘or’ forms the unit
history
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In this formalism the notion of probability is still involved because of the use of second-level proposi-
tions that refer to the probability of realizing a history. Therefore, the notion of a decoherence functional
is still central in Isham’s approach since, it is only in terms of this quantity that the probabilities of
histories are determined
In the present paper the approach is different. We start with the topos formulation of physical
theories as discussed in detail by Do¨ring and Isham in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and [10]. In particular we start
with these authors’ topos formulation of standard quantum mechanics and extend it to become a new
history version of quantum theory. As we shall see, this new formalism departs from consistent-history
theory in that it does not make use of the notion of consistent sets, and thus of a decoherence functional.
This result is striking since the notion of a decoherence functional is an essential feature in all of the
history formalisms that have been suggested so far.
In deriving this new topos version of history theory, we had in mind that in the consistent-history
approach to quantum mechanics there is no explicit state-vector reduction process induced by measure-
ments. This suggests postulating that, given a state |ψ〉t1 at time t1, the truth value of a proposition
A1 ∈ ∆1 at time t1 should not influence the truth value of a proposition A2 ∈ ∆2 with respect to the
state, |ψ〉t2 = Uˆ(t2, t1) |ψ〉t1 , at some later time t2.
Thus for a history proposition of the form “the quantity A1 has a value in ∆1 at time t1, and then the
quantity A2 has a value in ∆2 at time t1 = 2, and then · · · ” it should be possible to determine its truth
value in terms of the individual (generalised) truth values of the constituent single-time propositions as in
the work of Do¨ring and Isham. Thus our goal is use topos theory to define truth values of sequentially-
connected propositions, i.e., a time-ordered sequence of proposition, each of which refers to a single
time.
As we will see, the possibility of doing this depends on how entanglement is taken into consideration.
In fact, it is possible to encode the concept of entanglement entirely in the elements (which, for reasons to
become clear, we will call ‘contexts’) of the base category with which we are working. In particular, when
entanglement is not taken into account the context category is just a product category. In this situation
it is straightforward to exhibit a direct dependence between the truth values of a history proposition,
both homogeneous and inhomogeneous, and the truth values of its constituent single-time components.
Moreover, in this case it is possible to identify all history propositions with certain subobjects which
are the categorical products of the appropriate pull-backs of the subobjects that represent the single-
time propositions. It follows that, when entanglement is not considered, a precise mathematical relation
between history propositions and their individual components subsists, even for inhomogeneous proposi-
tions. This is an interesting feature of the topos formalism of history theories which we develop since it
implies that, in order to correctly represent history propositions as sequentially connected proposition,
it suffice to use a topos in which the notion of entanglement is absent. However, if we were to use the
full topos in which entanglement is present then a third type of history propositions would arise, namely
entangled inhomogeneous propositions. It is precisely such propositions that can not be defined in terms
of sequentially connected single-time propositions. This is a consequence of the fact that projection
operators onto entangled states cannot be viewed, in the context of history theory, as inhomogeneous
propositions.
Our goal is to construct to a topos formulation of quantum history theory as defined in the HPO
formalism2. In particular, HPO history propositions will be considered as entities to which the Do¨ring-
Isham topos procedure can be applied. Since the set of HPO history-propositions forms a temporal
logic, the possibility arises of representing such histories as subobjects in a certain topos which contains
a temporal logic formed from Heyting algebras of certain subobjects in the single-time topoi. In this
paper we will develop such a logic. Moreover, we will also develop a temporal logic of truth values and
2The acronym ‘HPO’ stands for ‘history projection operator’ and was the name given by Isham to his own (non-
topos based) approach to consistent-history quantum theory. This approach is distinguished by the fact that any history
proposition is represented by a projection operator in a new Hilbert space that is the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces
at the constituent times. In the older approaches, a history proposition is represented by a sum of products of projection
operators, and this is almost always not itself a projection operator. Thus the HPO formalism is a natural framework with
which to realise ‘temporal quantum logic’.
3
discuss the extent to which the evaluation map, which assigns truth values to propositions, does or does
not preserve all the temporal connectives. An interesting feature of the topos analogue of the HPO
formalism of quantum history theory is that, although it is possible to represent such a formalism within
a topos in which the notion of entanglement is present (full topos), in order to correctly define history
propositions and their truth values, we have to resort to the intermediate topos. Specifically we need to
pull back history propositions as expressed in the full topos to history propositions as expressed in the
intermediate topos in which the notion of entanglement is not present. This is necessary since history
propositions per se are defined as sequentially connected single-time propositions and such a definition
makes sense only in a topos in which the context category is a product category (intermediate topos).
It is precisely to such an intermediate topos that the correct temporal logic of Heyting algebras belongs.
The absence of the concept of probability is consistent with the philosophical motivation that under-
lines the idea in the first place of using topos theory to describe quantum mechanics. Namely, the need
to find an alternative to the instrumentalism that lies at the heart of the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics. In this respect, to maintain the use of a decoherence functional would conflict with
the basic philosophical premises of the topos approach to quantum theory. In fact, as will be shown
in the present paper, the topos formulation of quantum history theory does not employ a decoherence
functional, and the associated concept of ‘consistency’ is absent.
This is an advantage since it avoids the problem of the plethora of incompatible consistent history
sets. In fact, the novelty of this approach rests precisely on the fact that, although all possible history
propositions are taken into consideration, when defining the logical structure in terms of which truth
values are assigned to history propositions, there is no need to introduce the notion of consistent sets.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief introduction to the theory of
consistent histories. Section 3 is devoted to a description of the HPO formulation of history theory.
Then, in Section 4, we outline the topos formulation of quantum theory put forward by Isham and
Do¨ring, describing in detail how truth values of single-time propositions emerge from the formalism.
In section 5 we generalize the above-mentioned formalism to sequentially-connected propositions. In
particular, we assign truth values to history propositions in terms of the truth values of single-time
propositions for non-entangled settings. We also define the temporal logics of the Heyting algebra of
subobjects and of truth values, and we discuss the extent to which the evaluation map preserve temporal
connectives. Finally, in Section 6, the issue of entanglement leads us to introduce the topos version of
the HPO formalism of quantum history theory.
2 A Brief Introduction to Consistent Histories
Consistent histories theory was born as an attempt to describe closed systems in quantum mechanics,
partly in light of a desire to construct quantum theories of cosmology. In fact, the Copenhagen in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics cannot be applied to closed systems since it rests on the notion of
probabilities defined in terms of a sequence of repeated measurements by an external observer. Thus it
enforces a, cosmologically inappropriate, division between system and observer. The consistent-history
formulation avoids this division since it assigns probabilities without making use of the measurements
and the associated state vector reductions.
In the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, probability assignments to sequences
of measurements are computed using the von Neumann reduction postulate which, roughly speaking,
determines a measurement-induced change in the density matrix that represents the state. Therefore, to
give meaning to probabilities, the notion of measurement-induced, state vector reduction is essential.
The consistent history formalism was developed in order to make sense of probability assignments
but without invoking the notion of measurement. This requires introducing the decoherence functional,
d, which is a map from the space of all histories to the complex numbers. Specifically, given two histories
(sequences of projection operators) α = (αˆt1 , αˆt2 , · · · , αˆtn) and β = (βˆt1 , βˆt2 , · · · , βˆtn) the decoherence
functional is defined as
dρ,Hˆ(α, β) = tr(C˜
†
αρC˜β) = tr(Cˆ
†
αρCˆβ) (1)
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where ρ is the initial density matrix, Hˆ is the Hamiltonian, and C˜α represents the ‘class operator’ which
is defined in terms of the Schrodinger-picture projection operator αti as
C˜α := Uˆ(t0, t1)αt1 Uˆ(t1, t2)αt2 · · · Uˆ(tn−1, tn)αtnUˆ(tn, t0) (2)
Thus C˜α represents the history proposition “αt1 is true at time t1, and then αt2 is true at time t2, · · · ,
and then αtn is true at time tn”. It is worth noting that the class operator can be written as the product
of Heisenberg-picture projection operators in the form Cˆα = αˆtn(tn)αˆtn−1(tn−1) · · · αˆt1(t1). Generally
speaking this is not itself a projection operator.
The physical meaning associated to the quantity d(α, α) is that it is the probability of the history α
being realized. However, this interpretation can only be ascribed in a non-contradictory way if the history
α belongs to a special set of histories, namely a consistent set which, is a set {α1, α2, . . . , αn} of histories
which do not interfere with each other, i.e. d(αi, αj) = 0 for all i, j = 1, · · · , n. Only within a consistent
set does the definition of consistent histories have any physical meaning. In fact, it is only within a given
consistent set that the probability assignments are consistent. Each decoherence functional defines such
a consistent set(s).
For an in-depth analysis of the axioms and definition of consistent-history theory the reader is referred
to [12], [22], [27] and references therein. For the present paper only the following definitions are needed.
1. A homogeneous history is any sequentially-ordered sequence of projection operators αˆ1, αˆ2, · · · αˆn,
2. The definition of the join ∨ is straight forward when the two histories have the same time support
and differ in their values only at one point ti. In this case α∨β := (αt1 , αt2 , · · · , αti ∨βti , · · ·αtn) =
(βt1 , βt2 , · · · , βti ∨αti , · · ·βtn) is a homogeneous history and satisfies the relation Cˆα∨β = Cˆα ∨ Cˆβ .
The problem arises when the time supports are different, in particular when the two histories α and
β are disjoint. The join of such histories would take us outside the class of homogeneous histories.
Similarly the negation of a homogeneous history would not itself be a homogeneous history.
3. An inhomogeneous history arises when two disjoint homogeneous histories are joined using the
logical connective “or”(∨) or when taking the negation (¬) of a history proposition. Specifically,
given two disjoint homogeneous histories α and β we can meaningfully talk about the inhomo-
geneous histories α ∨ β and ¬α. Such histories are generally not a just a sequence of projection
operators, but when computing the decoherence functional they are represented by the operator
Cˆα∨β := Cˆα ∨ Cˆβ and Cˆ¬α := 1ˆ− Cˆα
Gel Mann and Hartle, tried to solve the problem of representing inhomogeneous histories using path
integrals on the configuration space, Q, of the system. In this formalism the histories α and β are seen
as subsets of the paths of Q. Then a pair of histories is said to be disjoint if they are disjoint subsets of
the path space Q. Seen as path integrals, the additivity property of the decoherence functional is easily
satisfied namely
d(α ∨ β, γ) = d(α, γ) + d(β, γ) (3)
where γ is any subset of the path space Q.
Similarly, the negation of a history proposition ¬α is represented by the complement of the subset α
of Q. Therefore
d(¬α, γ) = d(1, γ)− d(α, γ) (4)
where 1 is the unit history3.
The above properties in (3) and 4 are well defined in the context of path integrals. But what happens
when defining the decoherence functional on a string of projection operators? Gel’Mann and Hartle
3The unit history is the history which is always true
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solved this problem by postulating the following definitions for the class operators when computing
decoherence functionals:
C˜α∨β := C˜α + C˜β
C˜¬α := 1− C˜α (5)
if α and β are disjoint histories. The right hand side of these equations are indeed operators that
represent α ∨ β and ¬α when computing the decoherence functional, but as objects in the consistent-
history formalism, it is not really clear what α ∨ β and ¬α are.
In fact, as defined above, a homogeneous history is a time ordered sequence of projection operators, but
there is no analogue definition for α ∨ β or ¬α . One might try to define the inhomogeneous histories
¬α and α ∨ β component-wise so that, for a simple two-time history α = (αˆt1 , αˆt2), we would have
¬α = ¬(αˆt1 , αˆt2) := (¬αˆt1 ,¬αˆt2). (6)
However, this definition of the negation operation is wrong. For α is the temporal proposition “α1 is
true at time t1, and then α2 is true at time t2”, which we shall write as αˆt1 ⊓ αˆt2 . It is then intuitively
clear that the negation of this proposition should be
¬(αˆt1 ⊓ αˆt2) = (¬αˆt1 ⊓ αˆt2) ∨ (αˆt1 ⊓ ¬αˆt2) ∨ (¬αˆt1) ⊓ ¬(αˆt2) (7)
which is not in any obvious sense the same as (6).
A similar problem arises with the “or” (∨) operation. For, given two homogenous histories (α1, α2)
and (β1, β2), the ”or” operation defined component-wise is
(α1, α2) ∨ (β1, β2) := (α1 ∨ β1, α2 ∨ β2) (8)
This history would be true (realized) if both (α1∨β1) and (α2∨β2) are true, which implies that either an
element in each of the pairs (α1, α2) and (β1, β2) is true, or both elements in either of the pairs (α1, α2)
and (β1, β2) are true. But this contradicts with the actual meaning of the proposition (α1, α2)∨ (β1, β2),
which states that either history (α1, α2) is realized or history (β1, β2) is realized. In fact the ‘or’ in the
proposition (α1, α2) ∨ (β1, β2) should really be as follows
(α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) = (¬(α1 ⊓ α2) ∧ (β1 ⊓ β2)) ∨ ((α1 ⊓ α2) ∧ ¬(β1 ⊓ β2)) (9)
Thus for the proposition (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) to be true both elements in either of the pairs (α1 ⊓ α2)
and (β1 ⊓ β2) have to be true, but not all four elements at the same time. If instead we had the history
proposition from equation (16), (α1 ∨ β1) ⊓ (α2 ∨ β2), this would be equivalent to
(α1 ∨ β1) ⊓ (α2 ∨ β2) := (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (α1 ⊓ β2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ α2) ≥ (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) (10)
This shows that it is not possible to define inhomogeneous histories component-wise. Moreover, the
appeal to path integrals when defining C˜α∨β is realization-dependent and does not uncover what C˜α∨β
actually is.
However, the right hand sides of equations (5) have a striking similarity to the single-time propositions
in quantum logic. In fact, given two single-time propositions P and Q which are disjoint, the proposition
P ∨Q is simply represented by the projection operator Pˆ + Qˆ; similarly, the negation 6= P is represented
by the operator 1ˆ− Pˆ .
This similarity of the single-time propositions with the right hand side of the equations (5) suggests
that somehow it should be possible to identify history propositions with projection operators. Obviously
these projection operators cannot be the class operators since, generally, these are not projection opera-
tors. The claim that a logic for consistent histories can be defined such that each history proposition is
represented by a projection operator on some Hilbert space is also motivated by the fact that the state-
ment that a certain history is ”realized”, is itself a proposition. Therefore, the set of all such histories
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could possess a lattice structure similar to the lattice of single-time propositions in standard quantum
logic.
These considerations led Isham to construct the, so-called, HPO formalism. In this new formalism of
consistent histories it is possible to identify the entire set UP with the projection lattice of some ‘new’
Hilbert space. In the following Section we will describe this formalism in more detail.
3 The HPO formulation of consistent histories
As shown in the previous section, the identification of a homogeneous history α as a projection operator
on the direct sum ⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}Ht of n copies of the Hilbert space H, does not lead to a satisfactory
definition of a quantum logic for histories.
A solution to this problem was put forward by Isham in [7]. In this paper he introduces an alternative
formulation of consistent histories, namely the HPO (History Projection Operator) formulation. The
key idea is to identify homogeneous histories with tensor products of projection operators: i.e., α =
αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ αˆtn . This definition was motivated by the fact that, unlike a normal product, a tensor
product of projection operators is itself a projection operators since
(αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2)
2 = (αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2)(αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2) := αˆt1 αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 αˆt2
= αˆ2t1 ⊗ αˆ
2
t2
(11)
= αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 (12)
and
(αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2)
† := αˆ†t1 ⊗ αˆ
†
t2
(13)
= αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 (14)
For this alternative definition of a homogeneous history, the negation operation coincides with equa-
tion (7):
¬(αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2) = 1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ− αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 = (1ˆ− αˆt1)⊗ αˆt2 + αˆt1 ⊗ (1ˆ − αˆt2) + (1− αˆt1)⊗ (1− αˆt2) (15)
= ¬αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 + αˆt1 ⊗ ¬αˆt2 + ¬αˆt1 ⊗ ¬αˆt2
Moreover, given two disjoint homogeneous histories α = (αˆt1 , αˆt2) and β = (βˆt1 , βˆt2), then, since αˆt1 βˆt1 =
0 and/or αˆt2 βˆt2 = 0 it follows that the projection operators that represent the two propositions are
themselves disjoint ,i.e., (αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2)(βˆt1 ⊗ βˆt2) = 0. It is now possible to define α ∨ β as
(αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2) ∨ (βˆt1 ⊗ βˆt2) := (αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2) + (βˆt1 ⊗ βˆt2) (16)
In the HPO formalism, homogeneous histories are represented by ‘homogeneous’ projection opera-
tors in the lattice P (⊗t∈{t1,t2···tn}Ht), while inhomogeneous histories are represented by inhomogeneous
operators. Thus, for example, Pˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 ∨ Rˆ1 ⊗ Rˆ2 = Pˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 + Rˆ2 ⊗ Rˆ2 would be the join of the two
elements Pˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 and Rˆ2 ⊗ Rˆ2 as defined in the lattice P (⊗t∈{t1,t2}Ht).
Mathematically, the introduction of the tensor product is quite natural. In fact , as shown in the previ-
ous section, in the general history formalism a homogenous history is an element of ⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}P (Ht) ⊂
⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}B(Ht) which is a vector space. The vector space structure of ⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}B(Ht) is utilized
when defining the decoherence functional, since the map (αˆt1 , αˆt2 , · · · αˆtn)→ tr(αˆt1 (t1)αˆt2(t2) · · · αˆtn(tn))
is multi-linear.
However, tensor products are defined through the universal factorization property namely: given a
finite collection of vector spaces V1, V2, · · · , Vn, any multi-linear map µ : V1×V2×· · ·×Vn →W uniquely
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factorizes through a tensor product, i.e., the diagram
V1 ⊗ V2 · · · ⊗ Vn
µ
′
// W
V1 × V2 · · · × Vn
φ
OO
µ
::
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
commutes. Thus the map φ : (αˆt1 , αˆt2 , · · · αˆtn) 7→ αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 ⊗ · · · αˆtn arises naturally.
At the level of algebras, the map φ is defined is the obvious way as
φ : ⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}B(Ht)→ ⊗t∈{t1,t2···tn}B(Ht) (17)
This map is many-to-one since (λA)⊗(λ−1B) = A⊗B. However, if we restrict only to⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}P (Ht) ⊆
⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}B(Ht) then the map becomes one-to-one since for all projection operators Pˆ ∈ ⊕t∈{t1,t2···tn}P (Ht)
, λPˆ (λ 6= 0, Pˆ¬0) is a projection operator if and only if λ = 1.
In this scheme, the decoherence functional is computed using the map
D :⊗t∈{t1.t2···tn} B(H)→ B(H) (18)
(Aˆ1 ⊗ Aˆ2 · · · ⊗ Aˆn) 7→ (Aˆn(tn)Aˆn−1(tn−1) · · · Aˆ1(t1)) (19)
Since this map is linear, it can be extended to include inhomogeneous histories. Furthermore, the class
operators Cˆ can be defined as a map from the projectors on the Hilbert space ⊗t∈{t1,t2···tn}H seen as a
subset of all linear operators on ⊗t∈{t1,t2···tn}H to the operators on H
Cˆα := D(φ(α)) (20)
and again extended to inhomogeneous histories by linearity .
This map satisfies the relations C˜α∨β = C˜α ∨ C˜β and C˜¬α = 1− C˜α, and hence their justification by
path integrals is no longer necessary.
The HPO formalism can be extended to non-finite temporal supports by using an infinite (continuous
if necessary) tensor product of copies of B(H). The interested reader is referred to [Quantum logic and
the history approach to quantum theory]
4 Single-Time Truth Values in the Language of topos theory
We turn now to defining a quantum history formalism using topos theory. Our starting point is the
topos formulation of normal quantum theory put forward by Chris Isham and Andreas Do¨ring in [1], [2],
[3], [4] and [5] and by Chris Isham, Jeremy Butterfield, and collaborators [8], [25], [26], [9], [24]. We will
first give a very brief summary of some of the key concepts and constructions.
The main idea put forward by the authors in the above-mentioned papers is that using topos theory to
redefine the mathematical structure of quantum theory leads a reformulation of quantum theory in such
a way that it is made to ‘look like’ classical physics. Furthermore, this reformulation of quantum theory
has the key advantages that (i) no fundamental role is played by the continuum; and (ii) propositions
can be given truth values without needing to invoke the concepts of ‘measurement’ or ‘observer‘. Before
going into the details of how this topos-based reformulation of quantum theory is carried out, let us first
analyse the reasons why such a reformulation is needed in the first place. These concern quantum theory
general and quantum cosmology in particular.
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• As it stands quantum theory is non-realist. From a mathematical perspective this is reflected in
the Kocken-Specher theorem 4. This theorem implies that any statement regarding state of affairs,
formulated within the theory, acquires meaning contractually, i.e., after measurement. This implies
that it is hard to avoid the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which is intrinsically
non-realist.
• Notions of ‘measurement’ and ‘external observer’ pose problems when dealing with cosmology. In
fact, in this case there can be no external observer since we are dealing with a closed system.
But this then implies that the concept of ‘measurement’ plays no fundamental role, which in turn
implies that the standard definition of probabilities in terms of relative frequency of measurements
breaks down.
• The existence of the Planck scale suggests that there is no a priori justification for the adoption
of the notion of a continuum in the quantum theory used in formulating quantum gravity.
These considerations led Isham and Do¨ring to search for a reformulation of quantum theory that is
more realist5 than the existing one. It turns out that this can be achieved through the adoption of topos
theory as the mathematical framework with which to reformulate Quantum theory.
One approach to reformulating quantum theory in a more realist way is to re-express it in such a
way that it ‘looks like’ classical physics, which is the paradigmatic example of a realist theory. This is
precisely the strategy adopted by the authors in [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5]. Thus the first question is what
is the underlining structure which makes classical physics a realist theory?
The authors identified this structure with the following elements:
1. The existence of a state space S.
2. Physical quantities are represented by functions from the state space to the reals. Thus each
physical quantity, A, is represented by a function
fA : S → R (21)
3. Any propositions of the form “A ∈ ∆” (“The value of the quantity A lies in the subset ∆ ∈ R”)
is represented by a subset of the state space S: namely, that subspace for which the proposition is
true. This is just
f−1A (∆) = {s ∈ S|fA(s) ∈ ∆} (22)
The collection of all such subsets forms a Boolean algebra, denoted Sub(S).
4. States ψ are identified with Boolean-algebra homomorphisms
ψ : Sub(S)→ {0, 1} (23)
from the Boolean algebra Sub(S) to the two-element {0, 1}. Here, 0 and 1 can be identified as
‘false’ and ‘true’ respectively.
The identification of states with such maps follows from identifying propositions with subsets of S.
Indeed, to each subset f−1A ({∆}), there is associated a characteristic function χA∈∆ : S → {0, 1} ⊂
R defined by
χA∈∆(s) =
{
1 if fA(s) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise.
(24)
4 Kochen-Specker Theorem: if the dimension of H is greater than 2, then there does not exist any valuation function
V~Ψ : O → R from the set O of all bounded self-adjoint operators Aˆ of H to the reals R such that for all Aˆ ∈ O and all
f : R→ R, the following holds V~Ψ(f(Aˆ)) = f(V~Ψ(Aˆ)).
5By a ‘realist’ theory we mean one in which the following conditions are satisfied: (i) propositions form a Boolean
algebra; and (ii) propositions can always be assessed to be either true or false. As will be delineated in the following, in
the topos approach to quantum theory both of these conditions are relaxed, leading to what Isham and Do¨ring called a
neo-realist theory.
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Thus each state s either lies in f−1A ({∆}) or it does not. Equivalently, given a state s every
proposition about the values of physical quantities in that state is either true or false. Thus 23
follows
The first issue in finding quantum analogues of 1,2,3, and 4 is to consider the appropriate mathe-
matical framework in which to reformulate the theory. As previously mentioned the choice fell on topos
theory. There were many reasons for this, but a paramount one is that in any topos (which is a special
type of category) distributive logics arise in a natural way: i.e., a topos has an internal logical structure
that is similar in many ways to the way in which Boolean algebras arise in set theory. This feature is
highly desirable since requirement 3 implies that the subobjects of our state space (yet to be defined)
should form some sort of logical algebra.
The second issue is to identify which topos is the right one to use. Isham et al achieved this by
noticing that the possibility of obtaining a ‘neo-realist’ reformulation of quantum theory lied in the idea
of a context. Specifically, because of the Kocken-Specher theorem, the only way of obtaining quantum
analogues of requirements 1,2,3 and 4 is by defining them with respect to commutative subalgebras
(the ‘contexts’) of the non-commuting algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on the quantum theory’s
Hilbert space.
The set of all such commuting algebras (chosen to be von Neumann algebras) forms a category,
V(H), called the context category. These contexts will represent classical ‘snapshots’ of reality, or ‘world-
views’. From a mathematical perspective, the reason for choosing commutative subalgebras as contexts
is because, via the Gel’fand transform6, it is possible to write the self-adjoint operators in such an algebra
as continuous functions from the Gel’fand spectrum7 to the complex numbers. This is similar to how
physical quantities are represented in classical physics, namely as maps from the state space to the real
numbers.
The fact that the set of all contexts forms a category is very important. The objects in this category,
V(H), are defined to be the commutative von Neumann subalgebras of B(H), and we say there is an
arrow iV2,V1 : V1 → V2 if V1 ⊆ V2. The existence of this arrows implies that relations between different
contexts can be formed. Then, given this category, V(H), of commutative von Neumann subalgebras,
the topos for formulating quantum theory chosen by Isham et al is the topos of presheaves over V(H),
i.e. SetsV(H)
op
. Within this topos they define the analogue of 1,2,3, and 4 to be the following.
1. The state space is represented by the spectral presheaf Σ.
Definition 4.1 The spectral presheaf, Σ, is the covariant functor from the category V(H)op to
Sets (equivalently, the contravariant functor from V(H) to Sets) defined by:
• Objects: Given an object V in V(H)op, the associated set Σ(V ) is defined to be the Gel’fand
spectrum of the (unital) commutative von Neumann sub-algebra V ; i.e., the set of all multi-
plicative linear functionals λ : V → C such that λ(1ˆ) = 1
• Morphisms: Given a morphism iV ′V : V
′
→ V (V
′
⊆ V ) in V(H)op, the associated function
Σ(iV ′V ) : Σ(V ) → Σ(V
′
) is defined for all λ ∈ Σ(V ) to be the restriction of the functional
λ : V → C to the subalgebra V
′
⊆ V , i.e. Σ(iV ′V )(λ) := λ|V ′
2. Propositions, represented by projection operators in quantum theory, are identified with clopen
subobjects of the spectral presheaf. A clopen subobject S ⊆ Σ is an object such that for each
context V ∈ V(H)
op
the set S(V ) is a clopen (both closed and open) subset of Σ(V ) where the
6Given a commutative von Neumann algebra V, the Gel’fand transform is a map
V → C(Σ
V
) (25)
Aˆ 7→ A¯ : Σ
V
→ C (26)
where Σ
V
is the Gel’fand spectrum; A¯ is such that ∀λ ∈ Σ
V
A¯(λ) := λ(Aˆ).
7 Given an algebra V, the Gel’fand spectrum, Σ
V
, is the set of all multiplicative, linear functionals, λ : V → C, of norm
1.
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latter is equipped with the usual, compact and Hausdorff, spectral topology. Since this a crucial
step for the concepts to be developed in this paper we will briefly outline how it was derived. For
a detailed analysis the reader is referred to [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5].
As a first step, we have to introduce the concept of ‘daseinization’. Roughly speaking, what
daseinization does is to approximate operators so as to ‘fit’ into any given context V . In fact,
because the formalism defined by Isham et al is contextual, any proposition one wants to consider,
has to be studied within (with respect to ) each context V ∈ V(H).
To see how this works, consider the case in which we would like to analyse the projection operator
Pˆ corresponding via the spectral theorem to, say, the proposition “A ∈ ∆”. In particular, let us
take a context V such that Pˆ /∈ P (V ) (the projection lattice of V ). We somehow need to define
a projection operator which does belong to V and which is related in some way to our original
projection operator Pˆ . This was achieved in [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5] by approximating Pˆ from above
in V with the ‘smallest’ projection operator in V greater than or equal to Pˆ . More precisely, the
outer daseinization, δo(Pˆ ), of Pˆ is defined at each context V by
δo(Pˆ )V :=
∧
{Rˆ ∈ P (V )|Rˆ ≥ Pˆ} (27)
This process of outer daseinization takes place for all contexts, and hence gives, for each projection
operator Pˆ , a collection of daseinized projection operators, one for each context V, i.e.,
Pˆ 7→ {δo(Pˆ )V |V ∈ V(H)} (28)
Because of the Gel’fand transform, to each operator Pˆ ∈ P (V ) there is associated the map P¯ :
ΣV → C which takes values in {0, 1} ⊂ R ⊂ C since Pˆ is a projection operator. Thus P¯ is a
characteristic function of the subset S
Pˆ
⊆ Σ(V ) defined by
S
Pˆ
:= {λ ∈ Σ(V )|P¯ (λ) := λ(Pˆ ) = 1} (29)
Since P¯ is continuous with respect to the spectral topology on Σ(V ), then P¯−1(1) = S
Pˆ
is a clopen
subset of Σ(V ) since both {0} and {1} are closed subsets of the Hausdorff space C.
Through the Gel’fand transform it is then possible to define an bijective map from projection
operators, δ(Pˆ )V ∈ P (V ), and clopen subsets of the spectral presheaf ΣV where, for each context
V,
Sδo(Pˆ )V := {λ ∈ ΣV |λ(δ
o(Pˆ )V ) = 1} (30)
This correspondence between projection operators and clopen subsets of the spectral presheaf Σ,
implies the existence of a lattice homeomorphism, for each V ,
S : P (V )→ Subcl(Σ)V (31)
such that
δo(Pˆ )V 7→ S(δ
o(Pˆ )V ) := Sδo(Pˆ )V (32)
It was shown in [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5] that the collection of subsets S
δ(Pˆ )V
, V ∈ V(H), forms a
subobject of Σ. This enables us to define the (outer) daseinization as a mapping from the projection
operators to the subobject of the spectral presheaf given by
δ :P (H)→ Subcl(Σ) (33)
Pˆ 7→ (S(δo(Pˆ )V ))V ∈V(H) =: δ(Pˆ ) (34)
We will sometimes denote S(δo(Pˆ )V ) as δ(Pˆ )
V
Since the subobjects of the spectral presheaf form a Heyting algebra, the above map associates
propositions to a distributive lattice. Actually, it is first necessary to show that the collection of
clopen subobjects of Σ is a Heyting algebra, but this was done by Do¨ring and Isham.
Two particular properties of the daseinization map that are worth mentioning are
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(a) δ(A ∨B) = δ(A) ∨ δ(B) i.e. it preserves the ”or” operation
(b) δ(A ∧B) ≤ δ(A) ∧ δ(B), i.e. it does not preserve the ”and” operation
3. In classical physics a pure state, s, is a point in the state space. It is the smallest subset of the state
space which has measure one with respect to the Dirac measure δs. This is a consequence of the
one-to-one correspondence which subsists between pure states and Dirac measure. In particular, for
each pure state s there corresponds a unique Dirac measure δs. Moreover, propositions which are
true in a pure state s are given by subsets of the state space which have measure one with respect
to the Dirac δs, i.e., those subsets which contain s. The smallest such subset is the one-element set
{s}. Thus a pure state can be identified with a single point in the state space.
In classical physics, more general states are represented by more general probability measures on
the state space. This is the mathematical framework that underpins classical statistical physics.
However, the spectral presheaf Σ has no points8: indeed, this is equivalent to the Kochen-Specker
theorem! Thus the analogue of a pure state must be identified with some other construction.
There are two (ultimately equivalent) possibilities: a ‘state’ can be identified with (i) an element of
P (P (Σ)); or (ii) an element of P (Σ). The first choice is called the truth-object option; the second
is the pseudo-state option. In what follows we will concentrate on the second option.
Specifically, given a pure quantum state ψ ∈ H we define the presheaf
w
|ψ〉 := δ( |ψ〉〈ψ|) (35)
such that for each stage V we have
δ( |ψ〉〈ψ|)
V
:= S(
∧
{αˆ ∈ P (V )| |ψ〉〈ψ| ≤ αˆ}) ⊆ Σ(V ) (36)
Where the map S was defined in equation (30).
It was shown in [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5] that the map
|ψ〉 → w |ψ〉 (37)
is injective. Thus for each state |ψ〉 there is associated a topos pseudo-state, w |ψ〉, which is defined
as a subobject of the spectral presheaf Σ.
This presheaf w |ψ〉 is interpreted as the smallest clopen subobject of Σ which represents the propo-
sition which is totally true in the state ψ. Roughly speaking, it is the closest one can get to defining
a point in Σ.
4. For the sake of completeness we will also mention how a physical quantity is represented in this
formalism. For a detail definition and derivation of the terms the reader is referred to [1], [2], [3],
[4] and [5]
Given an operator Aˆ, the physical quantity associated to it is represented by a certain arrow
Σ→ R↔ (38)
where the presheaf R↔ is the ‘quantity-value object’ in this theory; i.e., it is the object in which
physical quantities ‘take there values’. We note that, in this quantum case, the quantity-value
object is not the real-number object.
Thus, by using a topos other than the topos of sets it is possible to reproduce the main structural
elements which would render any theory as being ‘classical’.
8In a topos τ , a ‘point’ (or ‘global element’; or just ‘element’) of an object O is defined to be a morphism from the
terminal object, 1τ , to O.
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We are now interested in how truth values are assigned to propositions, which in this case are
represented by daseinized operators δ(Pˆ ). For this purpose it is worth thinking again about classical
physics. There, we know that a proposition Aˆ ∈ ∆ is true for a given state s if s ∈ f−1
Aˆ
(∆), i.e., if s
belongs to those subsets f−1
Aˆ
(∆) of the state space for which the proposition Aˆ ∈ ∆ is true. Therefore,
given a state s, all true propositions of s are represented by those measurable subsets which contain s,
i.e., those subsets which have measure 1 with respect to the measure δs.
In the quantum case, a proposition of the form “A ∈ ∆” is represented by the presheaf δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])
where Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] is the spectral projector for the self-adjoint operator Aˆ onto the subset ∆ of the spectrum
of Aˆ. On the other hand, states are represented by the presheaves w |ψ〉. As described above, these
identifications are obtained using the maps S : P (V ) → Subcl(ΣV ), V ∈ V(H), and the daseinization
map δ : P (H)→ Subcl(Σ), with the properties that
{S(δ(Pˆ )V ) | V ∈ V(H)} := δ(Pˆ ) ⊆ Σ
{S(w |ψ〉)V ) | V ∈ V(H)} := w
|ψ〉 ⊆ Σ (39)
As a consequence, within the structure of formal, typed languages, both presheaves w |ψ〉 and δ(Pˆ ) are
terms of type PΣ [6].
We now want to define the condition by which, for each context V , the proposition (δ(Pˆ ))V is true
given w
|ψ〉
V . To this end we recall that, for each context V , the projection operator w
|ψ〉
V can be written
as follows
w
|ψ〉
V =
∧
{αˆ ∈ P (V )| |ψ〉〈ψ| ≤ αˆ}
=
∧
{αˆ ∈ P (V )|〈ψ|αˆ |ψ〉 = 1}
= δo( |ψ〉〈ψ|)V (40)
This represents the smallest projection in P(V) which has expectation value equal to one with respect
to the state |ψ〉. The associated subset of the Gel’fand spectrum is defined as w
|ψ〉
V = S(
∧
{αˆ ∈
P (V )|〈ψ|αˆ |ψ〉 = 1}). It follows that w |ψ〉 := {w
|ψ〉
V | V ∈ V(H)} is the subobject of the spectral
presheaf Σ such that at each context V ∈ V(H) it identifies those subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum which
correspond (through the map S) to the smallest projections of that context which have expectation value
equal to one with respect to the state |ψ〉; i.e., which are true in |ψ〉.
On the other hand, at a given context V , the operator δ(Pˆ )V is defined as
δo(Pˆ )V :=
∧
{αˆ ∈ P (V )|Pˆ ≤ αˆ} (41)
Thus the sub-presheaf δ(Pˆ ) is defined as the subobject of Σ such that at each context V it defines
the subset δ(Pˆ )
V
of the Gel’fand spectrum Σ(V ) which represents (through the map S) the projection
operator δ(Pˆ )V .
We are interested in defining the condition by which the proposition represented by the subobject
δ(Pˆ ) is true given the state w |ψ〉. Let us analyse this condition for each context V. In this case, we need
to define the condition by which the projection operator δ(Pˆ )V associated to the proposition δ(Pˆ ) is true
given the pseudo state w |ψ〉. Since at each context V the pseudo-state defines the smallest projection
in that context which is true with probability one: i.e., (w |ψ〉)V . For any other projection to be true
given this pseudo-state, this projection must be a coarse-graining of (w |ψ〉)V , i.e., it must be implied by
(w |ψ〉)V . Thus if (w
|ψ〉)V is the smallest projection in P (V ) which is true with probability one, then
the projector δ(Pˆ )V will be true if and only if δ(Pˆ )V ≥ (w
|ψ〉)V . This condition is a consequence of the
fact that if 〈ψ|αˆ |ψ〉 = 1 then for all βˆ ≥ αˆ it follows that 〈ψ|βˆ |ψ〉 = 1.
So far we have defined a ‘truthfulness’ relation at the level of projection operators. Through the map
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S it is possible to shift this relation to the level of subobjects of the Gel’fand spectrum:
S((w |ψ〉)V ) ⊆ S(δ(Pˆ )V ) (42)
w
|ψ〉
V ⊆ δ(Pˆ )V
{λ ∈ Σ(V )|λ((δo( |ψ〉〈ψ|)V ) = 1} ⊆ {λ ∈ Σ(V )|λ((δ
o(Pˆ ))V ) = 1} (43)
What the above equation reveals is that, at the level of subobjects of the Gel’fand spectrum, for each
context V , a ‘proposition’ can be said to be (totally) true for given a pseudo-state if, and only if, the
subobjects of the Gel’fand spectrum associated to the pseudo-state are subsets of the corresponding
subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum associated to the proposition. It is straightforward to see that if
δ(Pˆ )V ≥ (w
|ψ〉)V then S((w
|ψ〉)V ) ⊆ S(δ(Pˆ )V ) since for projection operators the map λ takes the
values 0,1 only.
We still need a further abstraction in order to work directly with the presheaves w |ψ〉 and δ(Pˆ ).
Thus we want the analogue of equation (42) at the level of subobjects of the spectral presheaf, Σ. This
relation is easily derived to be
w
|ψ〉 ⊆ δ(Pˆ ) (44)
Equation (44) shows that whether or not a proposition δ(Pˆ ) is ‘totally true’ given a pseudo state
w
|ψ〉 is determined by whether or not the pseudo-state is a sub-presheaf of the presheaf δ(Pˆ ). With
motivation, we can now define the generalised truth value of the proposition “A ∈ ∆” at stage V , given
the state w |ψ〉, as:
v(A ∈ ∆; |ψ〉)V = v(w
|ψ〉 ⊆ δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]))V (45)
:= {V
′
⊆ V |(w |ψ〉)V ⊆ δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]))
V
} (46)
= {V
′
⊆ V |〈ψ|δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) |ψ〉 = 1}
The last equality is derived by the fact that (w |ψ〉)V ⊆ δ(Pˆ )
V
is a consequence of the fact that at the
level of projection operator δo(Pˆ )V ≥ (w
|ψ〉)V . But since (w
|ψ〉)V is the smallest projection operator
such that 〈ψ|(w |ψ〉)V |ψ〉 = 1 then δ
o(Pˆ )V ≥ (w
|ψ〉)V implies that 〈ψ|δ
o(Pˆ ) |ψ〉 = 1.
The right hand side of equation (45) means that the truth value, defined at V , of the proposition
“A ∈ ∆” given the state w |ψ〉 is given in terms of all those sub-contexts V
′
⊆ V for which the projection
operator δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]))V has expectation value equal to one with respect to the state |ψ〉. In other
words, this partial truth value is defined to be the set of all those sub-contexts for which the proposition
is totally true.
The reason all this works is that generalised truth values defined in this way form a sieve on V ; and
the set of all of these is a Heyting algebra. Specifically: v(w |ψ〉 ⊆ δ(Pˆ ))V is a global element, defined at
stage V, of the subobject classifier Ω := (ΩV )V ∈V(H) where ΩV represents the set of all sieves defined at
stage V. The rigorous definitions of both sieves and subobject classifier are given below. For a detailed
analysis see [31], [28], [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5]
Definition 4.2 A sieve on an object A in a topos, τ , is a collection, S, of morphisms in τ whose
co-domain is A and such that, if f : B → A ∈ S then, given any morphisms g : C → B we have fog ∈ S.
An important property of sieves is the following. If f : B → A belongs to a sieve S on A, then the
pullback of S by f determines a principal sieve on B, i.e.
f∗(S) := {h : C → B|foh ∈ S} = {h : C → B} =: ↓B (47)
The principal sieve of an object A, denoted ↓A, is the sieve that contains the identity morphism of A;
therefore it is the biggest sieve on A.
For the particular case in which we are interested, namely sieves defined on the poset V(H), the
definition of a sieve can be simplified as follows:
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Definition 4.3 For all V ∈ V(H), a sieve S on V is a collection of subalgebras (V
′
⊆ V ) such that, if
V
′
∈ S and (V
′′
⊆ V
′
), then V
′′
∈ S. Thus S is a downward closed set.
In this case a maximal sieve on V is
↓V := {V
′
∈ V(H)|V
′
⊆ V } (48)
The set of all sieves for each context V can be fitted together so as to give the presheaf Ω which is defined
as follows:
Definition 4.4 The presheaf Ω ∈ SetsV(H)
op
is defined as follows:
1. For any V ∈ V(H), the set Ω(V ) is defined as the set of all sieves on V .
2. Given a morphism iV ′V : V
′
→ V (V
′
⊆ V ), the associated function in Ω is
Ω(iV ′V ) :Ω(V )→ Ω(V
′
) (49)
S 7→ Ω((iV ′V ))(S) := {V
′′
⊆ V
′
|V
′′
∈ S} (50)
In order for the above definition to be correct we need to show that indeed Ω((iV ′V ))(S) := {V
′′
⊆
V
′
|V
′′
∈ S} defines a sieve on V
′
. To this end we need to show that Ω((iV ′V ))(S) := {V
′′
⊆ V
′
|V
′′
∈ S}
is a downward closed set with respect to V
′
. It is straightforward to see this.
As previously stated, truth values are identified with global section of the presheaf Ω. The global
section that consists entirely of principal sieves is interpreted as representing ‘totally true’: in classical,
Boolean logic, this is just ‘true’. Similarly, the global section that consists of empty sieves is interpreted
as ‘totally false’: in classical Boolean logic, this is just ‘false’.
In the context of the topos formulation of quantum theory, truth values for propositions are defined
by equation (45). However, it is important to emphasise that the truth values refer to proposition at a
given time. It is straightforward to introduce time dependence in natural way. For example, we could
use the curve t 7→ w |ψ〉t where |ψ〉t satisfies the usual time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation.
However, our intention is to follow a quite different path and to extend the topos formalism to
temporally-ordered collections of propositions. Our goal is to construct a quantum history formalism
in the language of topos theory. In particular, we want to be able to assign generalised truth values to
temporal propositions. An important question is the extent to which such truth values can be derived
from the truth values of the constituent propositions.
5 The Temporal Logic of Heyting Algebras of Subobjects
5.1 Introducing the tensor product
In this Section we begin to consider sequences of propositions at different times; these are commonly
called ‘homogeneous histories’. The goal is to assign truth value to such propositions using a temporal
extension of the topos formalism discussed in the previous Sections.
As previously stated, in the consistent-history program, a central goal is to get rid of the idea of
state-vector reductions induced by measurements. The absence of the state-vector reduction process
implies that given a state ψ(t0) at time t0, the truth value (if there is one) of a proposition “A0 ∈ ∆0”
with respect to ψ(t0) should not influence the truth value of a proposition “A1 ∈ ∆1” with respect to
ψ(t1) = Uˆ(t1, t0)ψ(t0), the evolved state at time t1. This suggests that, if it existed, the truth value
of a homogeneous history should be computable from the truth values of the constituent single-time
propositions.
Of course, such truth values do not exist in standard quantum theory. However, as we have discussed
in the previous Sections, they do in the topos approach to quantum theory. Furthermore, since there is
no explicit state reduction in that scheme, it seems reasonable to try to assign a generalised truth value
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to a homogeneous history by employing the topos truth values that can be assigned to the constituent
single-time propositions at each of the time points in the temporal support of the proposition.
With this in mind let us consider the (homogeneous) history proposition αˆ = “the quantity A1 has
a value in ∆1 at time t1, and then the quantity A2 has value in ∆2 at time t2, and then . . . and then
the quantity An has value in ∆n at time tn” which is a time-ordered sequence of different propositions
at different given times (We are assuming that t1 < t2 < · · · < tn). Thus α represents a homogeneous
history. Symbolically, we can write α as
α = (A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ (An ∈ ∆n)tn (51)
where the symbol ‘⊓’ is the temporal connective ‘and then’.
The first thing we need to understand is how to ascribe some sort of ‘temporal structure’ to the
Heyting algebras of subobjects of the spectral presheaves at the relevant times. What we are working
towards here is the notion of the ‘tensor product’ of Heyting algebras. As a first step towards motivating
the definition, let us reconsider the history theory of classical physics in this light.
For classical history theory, the topos under consideration is Sets. In this case the state spaces Σi
for each time ti, are topological spaces and we can focus on their Heyting algebras of open sets. For
simplicity we will concentrate on two-time histories, but the arguments generalise at once to any histories
whose temporal support is a finite set.
Thus, consider propositions α1, β1 at time t1 and α2, β2 at time t2, and let
9 S1, S
′
1 ∈ Subop(Σ1) and
S2, S
′
2 ∈ Subop(Σ2) be the open subsets
10 that represent them. Now consider the homogeneous history
propositions α1 ⊓ α2 and β1 ⊓ β2, and the inhomogeneous proposition α1 ⊓ α2 ∨ β1 ⊓ β2. Heuristically,
this proposition is true (or the history is realized) if either history α1⊓α2 is realized, or history β1⊓β2 is
realised. In the classical history theory, α1 ⊓ α2 and β1 ⊓ β2 are represented by the subsets (of Σ1 ×Σ2)
S1 × S2 and S
′
1 × S
′
2 respectively. However, it is clearly not possible to represent the inhomogeneous
proposition (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) by any subset of Σ1 × Σ2 which is itself of the product form O1 ×O2.
What if instead we consider the proposition (α1∨β1)⊓(α2∨β2), which is represented by the subobject
S1 ∪ S
′
1 × S2 ∪ S
′
2: symbolically, we write
(α1 ∨ β1) ⊓ (α2 ∨ β2) 7→ S1 ∪ S
′
1 × S2 ∪ S
′
2 (52)
This history has a different meaning from (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2), since it indicates that at time t1 either
proposition α1 or β1 is realized, and subsequently, at time t2, either α2 or β2 is realized. It is clear
intuitively that we then have the equation
(α1 ∨ β1) ⊓ (α2 ∨ β2) := (α1 ⊓ β2) ∨ (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) (53)
The question that arises now is how to represent these inhomogeneous histories in such a way that
equation (53) is somehow satisfied when using the representation of (α1 ∨ β1) ⊓ (α2 ∨ β2) in equation
(52).
The point is that if we take just the product Subop(Σ1) × Subop(Σ2) then we cannot represent
inhomogeneous histories, and therefore cannot find a realisation of the right hand side of equation (53).
However, in the case at hand the answer is obvious since we know that Subop(Σ1)× Subop(Σ2) does not
exhaust the open sets in the topological space Σ1×Σ2. By itself, Subop(Σ1)×Subop(Σ2) is the collection
of open sets in the disjoint union of Σ1 and Σ2, not the Cartesian product.
In fact, as we know, the subsets of Σ1 × Σ2 in Subop(Σ1) × Subop(Σ2) actually form a basis for the
topology on Σ1 × Σ2: i.e., an arbitrary open set can be written as a union of elements of Subop(Σ1) ×
Subop(Σ2). It is then clear that the representation of the inhomogeneous history (α1 ⊓α2)∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) is
(α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) 7→ S1 × S
′
1 ∪ S2 × S
′
2 (54)
9We will denote the set of open subsets of a topological space, X, by Subop(X).
10Arguably, it is more appropriate to represent propositions in classical physics with Borel subsets, not just open ones.
However, will not go into this subtlety here.
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It is easy to check that equation (53) is satisfied in this representation.
It is not being too fanciful to imagine that we have here made the transition from the product Heyting
algebra Subop(Σ1)× Subop(Σ2) to a tensor product; i.e., we can tentatively postulate the relation
Subop(Σ1)⊗ Subop(Σ2) ≃ Subop(Σ1 × Σ2) (55)
The task now is to see if some meaning can be given in general to the tensor product of Heyting
algebras and, if so, if it is compatible with equation (55). Fortunately this is indeed possible although it
is easier to do this in the language of frames rather than Heyting algebras. Frames are easier to handle
is so far as the negation operation is not directly present. However, each frame gives rise to a unique
Heyting algebra, and vice versa (see below). So nothing is lost this way.
All this is described in detail in the book by Vickers [34]. In particular, we have the following
definition.
Definition 5.1 A frame A is a poset such that the following are satisfied
1. Every subset has a join
2. Every finite subset has a meet
3. Frame distributivity: x ∧
∨
Y =
∨
{x ∧ y : y ∈ Y }
i.e., binary meets distribute over joins. Here
∨
Y represents the join of the subset Y ⊆ A
We now come to something that is of fundamental importance in our discussion of topos temporal
logic: namely, the definition of the tensor product of two frames:
Definition 5.2 [34] Given two frames A and B, the tensor product A ⊗ B is defined to be the frame
represented by the following presentation
T 〈a⊗ b, a ∈ A and b ∈ B|∧
i
(ai ⊗ bi) =
(∧
i
ai
)
⊗
(∧
i
bi
)
(56)
∨
i
(ai ⊗ b) =
(∨
i
ai
)
⊗ b (57)
∨
i
(a⊗ bi) = a⊗
(∨
i
bi
)
(58)
In other words, we form the formal products, a ⊗ b, of elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B and subject them to the
relations in equations (56)–(58). Our intention is to use the tensor product as the temporal connective,
⊓, meaning ‘and then’. It is straight forward to show that equations (56)–(58) are indeed satisfied with
this interpretation when ‘∨’ and ‘∧’ are interpreted as ‘or’ and ‘and’ respectively.
We note that there are injective maps
i : A → A⊗B
a 7→ a⊗ true (59)
and
j : B → A⊗B
b 7→ true⊗ b (60)
These frame constructions are easily translated into the setting of Heyting algebras with the aid of
the following theorem [34]
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Theorem 5.1 Every frame A defines a complete Heyting algebra (cHa) in such a way that the operations
∧ and ∨ are preserved, and the implication relation → is defined as follows
a→ b =
∨
{c : c ∧ a ≤ b} (61)
Frame distributivity implies that (a→ b) ∧ a ≤ b, from which it follows
c ≤ a→ b iff c ∧ a ≤ b (62)
This is the definition of the pseudo-complement in the Heyting algebra.
Now that we have the definition of the tensor product of frames, and hence the definition of the
tensor product of Heyting algebras, we are ready to analyze quantum history propositions in terms of
topos theory.
Within a topos framework, propositions are identified with subobjects of the spectral presheaf. Thus
for example, given two systems S1 and S2, whose Hilbert spaces are H1 and H2 respectively, the propo-
sitions concerning each system are identified with elements of Sub(ΣH1) and Sub(ΣH2) respectively via
the process of ‘daseinization’. We will return later to the daseinization of history propositions, but for
the time being we will often, with a slight abuse of language, talk about elements of Sub(Σ) as ‘being’
propositions rather than as ‘representing propositions via the process of daseinization’.
With this in mind, since both Sub(ΣH1) and Sub(ΣH2) are Heyting algebras, it is possible to use
definition (5.2) to define the tensor product Sub(ΣH1)⊗ Sub(ΣH2) which is itself a Heyting algebra. We
propose to use such tensor products to represent the temporal logic of history propositions.
Because of the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between Heyting algebras and frames, in the
following we will first develop a temporal logic for frames in quantum theory and then generalize to a
temporal logic for Heyting algebras by utilizing Theorem 5.1. Thus we will consider Sub(ΣH1), Sub(ΣH2)
and Sub(ΣH1)⊗ Sub(ΣH2) as frames rather than Heyting algebras, thereby not taking into account the
logical connectives of implication and negation. These will then be reintroduced by applying Theorem
5.1.
Definition 5.3 Sub(ΣH1) ⊗ Sub(ΣH2) is the frame whose generators are of the form S1 ⊗ S2 for S1 ∈
Sub(ΣH1) and S2 ∈ Sub(Σ
H2), and such that the following relations are satisfied
∧
i∈I
(Si1 ⊗ S
i
2) =
(∧
i∈I
Si1
)
⊗
( ∧
j∈I
Sj2
)
(63)
∨
i∈I
(
Si1 ⊗ S2
)
= (
∨
i∈I
Si1)⊗ S2 (64)
∨
i∈I
(S1 ⊗ S
i
2) = S1 ⊗
(∨
i∈I
Si2
)
(65)
for an arbitrary index set I. From the above definition it follows that a general element of Sub(ΣH1)⊗
Sub(ΣH2) will be of the form
∨
i∈I
(
Si1 ⊗ S
i
2
)
.
5.2 Realizing the tensor product in a topos
We propose to use, via daseinization, the Heyting algebra Sub(ΣH1)⊗Sub(ΣH2) to represent the temporal
logical structure with which to handle (two-time) history propositions in the setting of topos theory. A
homogeneous history α1 ⊓ α2 will be represented by the daseinized quantity δ(αˆ1) ⊗ δ(αˆ2) and the
inhomogeneous history (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) by δ(αˆ1)⊗ δ(αˆ2) ∨ δ(βˆ1)⊗ δ(βˆ2), i.e. we denote
(α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) 7→ δ(αˆ1)⊗ δ(αˆ2) ∨ δ(βˆ1)⊗ δ(βˆ2) (66)
Here, the ‘∨’ refers to the ‘or’ operation in the Heyting algebra Sub(ΣH1)⊗ Sub(ΣH2).
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Our task now is to relate this, purely-algebraic representation, with one that involves subobjects of
some object in some topos. We suspect that there should be some connection with Sub(ΣH1⊗H2), but at
this stage it is not clear what this can be. What we need is a topos in which there is some object whose
Heyting algebra of sub-objects is isomorphic to Sub(ΣH1)⊗Sub(ΣH2): the connection with Sub(ΣH1⊗H2)
will then hopefully become clear.
Of course, in classical physics the analogue of ΣH1⊗H2 is just the Cartesian product Σ1 × Σ2, and
then, as we have indicated above, we have the relation Subop(Σ1)⊗ Subop(Σ2) ≃ Subop(Σ1 × Σ2). This
suggests that, in the quantum case, we should start by looking at the ‘product’ ΣH1 × ΣH2 . However,
here we immediately encounter the problem that ΣH1 and ΣH2 are objects in different topoi11, and so
we cannot just take their ‘product’ in the normal categorial way.
To get around this let us consider heuristically what defining something like ‘ΣH1 × ΣH2 ’ entails.
The fact that SetsH1 and SetsH2 are independent topoi strongly suggests that we will need something
in which the contexts are pairs 〈V1, V2〉 where V1 ∈ Ob(V(H1) and V2 ∈ Ob(V(H2)). In other words,
the base category for our new presheaf topos will be the product category V(H1) × V(H2), defined as
follows:
Definition 5.4 The category V(H1)× V(H2) is such that
• Objects: The objects are pairs of abelian von Neumann subalgebras 〈V1, V2〉 with V1 ∈ V(H1) and
V(H2)
• Morphisms: Given two such pair, 〈V1, V2〉 and 〈V
′
1 , V
′
2 〉, there exist an arrow l : 〈V
′
1 , V
′
2 〉 →
〈V1, V2〉 if and only if V
′
1 ⊆ V1 and V
′
2 ⊆ V2; i.e., if and only if there exists a morphism i1 : V
′
1 → V1
in V(H1) and a morphism i2 : V
′
2 → V2 in V(H2).
This product category V(H1)× V(H2) is related to the constituent categories, V(H1) and V(H2) by
the existence of the functors
p1 : V(H1)× V(H2)→ V(H1) (67)
p2 : V(H1)× V(H2)→ V(H2) (68)
which are defined in the obvious way. For us, the topos significance of these functors lies in the following
fundamental definition and theorem.
Definition 5.5 [31], [34] A geometric morphism φ : τ1 → τ2 between topoi τ1 and τ2 is defined to be a
pair of functors φ∗ : τ1 → τ2 and φ
∗ : τ2 → τ1, called respectively the inverse image and the direct image
part of the geometric morphism, such that
1. φ∗ ⊣ φ∗ i.e., φ
∗ is the left adjoint of φ∗
2. φ∗ is left exact, i.e., it preserves all finite limits.
In the case of presheaf topoi, an important source of such geometric morphisms arises from functors
between the base categories, according to the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 [31], [34] A functor φ : A → B between two categories A and B, induces a geometric
morphism (also denoted φ)
θ : SetsA
op
→ SetsB
op
(69)
of which the inverse image part θ∗ : SetsB
op
→ SetsA
op
is such that
F 7→ θ∗(F ) := F ◦ θ (70)
11Of course, in the case of temporal logic, the Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 are isomorphic, and hence so are the associated
topoi. However, their structural roles in the temporal logic are clearly different. In fact, in the closely related situation of
composite systems it will generally be the case that H1 and H2 are not isomorphic. Therefore, in the following, we will
not exploit this particular isomorphism.
19
Applying these results to the functors in equations (67)–(68) gives the geometric morphisms between
the topoi12 SetsV(H1)
op
, SetsV(H2)
op
and Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
p1 : Sets
(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
→ SetsV(H1)
op
(71)
p2 : Sets
(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
→ SetsV(H2)
op
(72)
with associated left-exact functors
p∗1 : Sets
V(H1)
op
→ Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
(73)
p∗2 : Sets
V(H2)
op
→ Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
(74)
This enables us to give a meaningful definition of the ‘product’ of ΣH1 and ΣH2 as
ΣH1 × ΣH2 := p∗1(Σ
H1)× p∗2(Σ
H2) (75)
where the ‘×’ on the right hand side of equation (75) is the standard categorial product in the topos
Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
.
We will frequently write the product, p∗1(Σ
H1) × p∗2(Σ
H2), in the simpler-looking form ‘ΣH1 × ΣH2 ’
but it must always be born in mind that what is really meant is the more complex form on the right
hand side of (75). The topos Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
will play an important role in what follows. We will
call it the ‘intermediate topos’ for reasons that will appear shortly.
We have argued that (two-time) history propositions, both homogeneous and inhomogeneous, should
be represented in the Heyting algebra Sub(ΣH1)⊗ Sub(ΣH2) and we now want to assert that the topos
that underlies such a possibility is precisely the intermediate topos Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
.
The first thing to notice is that the constituent single-time propositions can be represented in the
pull-backs p∗1(Σ
H1) and p∗2(Σ
H2) to the topos Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
, since we have that, for example, for
the functor p1,
p∗1(Σ
H1)〈V1,V2〉 := Σ
H1
V1
(76)
for all stages 〈V1, V2〉. Further more
p∗1(Σ
H1)× p∗2(Σ
H2)〈V1,V2〉 := Σ
H1
V1
× ΣH2V2 (77)
so that it is clear that we can represent two-time homogeneous histories in this intermediate topos.
However, at this point everything looks similar to the corresponding classical case. In particular we
have
Sub(p∗1(Σ
H1))× Sub(p∗2(Σ
H2)) ⊂ Sub(p∗1(Σ
H1)× p∗2(Σ
H2)) (78)
which is a proper subset relation because, as is clear from equation (77) the general subobject of ΣH1 ×
ΣH2 := p∗1(Σ
H1) × p∗2(Σ
H2) will be a ‘∨’ of product sub-objects in the Heyting algebra Sub(ΣH1) ×
Sub(ΣH2). In fact, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.3 There is an isomorphism of Heyting algebras
Sub(ΣH1)⊗ Sub(ΣH2) ≃ Sub(ΣH1 × ΣH2) (79)
In order to show there is an isomorphism between the algebras we will first construct an isomorphism
between the associated frames, the application of theorem 5.1 will then lead to the desired isomorphisms
between Heyting algebras. Because of the fact that the tensor product is given in terms of relations on
product elements, it suffices to define h on products S1 ⊗ S2 and show that the function thus defined
preserves these relations
12We are here exploiting the trivial fact that, for any pair of categories C1, C2, we have (C1 × C2)op ≃ C1
op × C2
op.
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The actual definition of h is the obvious one:
h : Sub(ΣV(H1))⊗ Sub(ΣV(H2)) → Sub(ΣH1 × ΣH2)
S1 ⊗ S2 7→ S1 × S2(:= p
∗
1S1 × p
∗
2S2) (80)
and the main thing is to show that equations (63) are preserved by h.
To this end consider the following
h
(∨
i
Si1 ⊗ S2
)
:= (
∨
i
Si1)× S2 (81)
For a given context 〈V1 V2〉 we have
h
(∨
i
Si1 ⊗ S2
)
〈V1 V2〉
= ((
∨
i
Si1)× S2)〈V1 V2〉
= (
⋃
i
Si1)V1 × (S2)V2
=
⋃
i
(Si1)V1 × (S2)V2)
=
⋃
i
(Si1 × S2)〈V1 V2〉
=
⋃
i
(
h(Si1 ⊗ S2)
)
〈V1 V2〉
=
(∨
i
h(Si1 ⊗ S2)
)
〈V1 V2〉
(82)
where the third equality follows from the general property of products (A ∪ B) × C = A× C ∪ B × C.
It follows that
h
(∨
i
Si1 ⊗ S2
)
=
∨
i
h
(
Si1 ⊗ S2) (83)
There is a very similar proof of
h
(∨
i
S1 ⊗ S
i
2
)
=
∨
i
h(S1 ⊗ S
i
2) (84)
Moreover
h
(∧
i∈I
Si1 ⊗ S
i
2
)
〈V1,V2〉
= h
(∧
i∈I
Si1 ⊗
∧
j∈I
Sj2
)
〈V1,V2〉
=
(∧
i∈I
Si1
)
V1
×
( ∧
j∈I
Sj2
)
=
⋂
i∈I
SiV1 ×
⋂
j∈I
SjV2 =
⋂
i∈I
(
SiV1 × S
i
V2
)
=
∧
i∈I
(Si1 × S
i
2)〈V1,V2〉 =
∧
i∈I
h(Si1 ⊗ S
i
2)〈V1,V2〉 (85)
from which it follows that
h
(∧
i∈I
Si1 ⊗ S
i
2
)
=
∧
i∈I
h(Si1 ⊗ S
i
2) (86)
as required.
The injectivity of h is obvious. The surjectivity follows from the fact than any element, R, of
Sub(ΣH1 × ΣH2) can be written as R = ∨i∈I(S
i
1 × S
i
2) = ∨i∈Ih(S
i
1 ⊗ S
i
2) = h
(
∨i∈I S
i
1 ⊗ S
i
2
)
(because h
is a homomorphism of frames)
Thus the frames Sub(ΣH1) ⊗ Sub(ΣH2) and Sub(ΣH1 × ΣH2) are isomorphic. The isomorphisms of
the associated Heyting algebras then follows from Theorem 5.1.
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5.3 Entangled stages
The discussion above reinforces the idea that homogeneous history propositions can be represented by
subobjects of products of pullbacks of single-time spectral presheaves.
However, in this setting there can be no notion of entanglement of contexts since the contexts are just
pairs 〈V1, V2〉; i.e., objects in the product category V(H1) × V(H2). To recover ‘context entanglement’
one needs to use the context category V(H1 ⊗ H2), some of whose objects are simple tensor products
V1⊗V2 (which, presumably, relates in some way to the pair 〈V1, V2〉) but others are ‘entangled’ algebras
of the form W = V1 ⊗ V2 + V3 ⊗ V4. Evidently, the discussion above does not apply to contexts of this
more general type.
To explore this further consider the following functor
θ : V(H1)× V(H2)→ V(H1 ⊗H2) (87)
〈V1, V2〉 7→ V1 ⊗ V2 (88)
where equation (88) refers to the action on the objects in the category V(H1)×V(H2); the action on the
arrows is obvious.
According to Theorem 5.2 this gives rise to a geometric morphism, θ, between topoi, and an associated
left-exact functor, θ∗:
θ : SetsV(H1) × SetsV(H2) → SetsV(H1⊗H2) (89)
θ∗ : SetsV(H1⊗H2) → SetsV(H1) × SetsV(H2) (90)
In particular, we can consider the pull-back θ∗(ΣH1⊗H2) which, on pairs of contexts, is:
(θ∗ΣH1⊗H2)〈V1,V2〉 := (Σ
H1⊗H2)θ〈V1,V2〉 = Σ
H1⊗H2
V1⊗V2
(91)
Thus the pull-back, θ∗(ΣH1⊗H2) of the spectral presheaf ofH1⊗H2 to the intermediate topos Sets
(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
completely reproduces ΣH1⊗H2 at contexts of the tensor-product form V1 ⊗ V2.
However, it is clear that, for all contexts V1, V2 we have
ΣH1⊗H2V1⊗V2
∼= ΣH1V1 × Σ
H2
V2
(92)
since we can define an isomorphic function
µ : ΣH1V1 × Σ
H2
V2
→ ΣH1⊗H2V1⊗V2 (93)
where, for all Aˆ⊗ Bˆ ∈ V1 ⊗ V2, we have
µ(〈λ1, λ2〉)(Aˆ⊗ Bˆ) := λ1(Aˆ)λ2(Bˆ) (94)
The fact that, for all contexts of the form V1 ⊗ V2, we have Σ
H1⊗H2
V1⊗V2
∼= ΣH1V1 × Σ
H2
V2
, means that,
θ∗(ΣH1⊗H2) ≃ ΣH1 × ΣH2 (95)
in the intermediate topos Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
. Thus, in the topos Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
, the product
ΣH1 × ΣH2 is essentially the spectral presheaf ΣH1⊗H2 but restricted to contexts of the form V1 ⊗ V2.
Thus Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
is an ‘intermediate’ stage in the progression from the pair of topoi SetsV(H1)
op
,
SetsV(H2)
op
to the topos SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
associated with the full tensor-product Hilbert space H1⊗H2.
This explains why we called Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
the ‘intermediate’ topos.
The choice of Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
as the appropriate topos to use in the setting of quantum temporal
logic reflects the fact that, although the full topos for quantum history theory is SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
, never-
the-less, to account for both homogeneous and inhomogeneous history propositions it suffices to use
the intermediate topos. However, if we do use the full topos SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
a third type of history
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proposition arises. These ‘entangled, inhomogeneous propositions’ cannot be reached/defined by single-
time propositions connected through temporal logic.
The existence of such propositions is a consequence of the fact that in the topos SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op
, the
context category V(H1⊗H2) contains ‘entangled’ abelian Von Neumann subalgebrasW : i.e., subalgebras
of the form V1 ⊗ V2 + V3 ⊗ V4 which cannot be reduced to a pure tensor product W1 ⊗W2. For such
contexts it is not possible to define a clear relation between a history proposition and individual single-
time propositions.
To clarify what is going on let us return for a moment to the HPO formalism of consistent history
theory. There, a time-ordered sequence of individual time propositions (i.e., a homogeneous history)
is identified with the tensor product of projection operators Pˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pˆn. We get a form of
‘entanglement’ when we consider inhomogeneous propositions Pˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 ∨ Pˆ3 ⊗ Pˆ4 that cannot be written
as Qˆ1⊗ Qˆ2. However, this type of entanglement, which comes from logic, is not exactly the same as the
usual entanglement of quantum mechanics (although there are close connections).
To understand this further consider a simple example in ordinary quantum theory of an entangled
pair of spin-up spin-down particles. A typical entangled state is
| ↑〉| ↓〉 − | ↓〉| ↑〉 (96)
and the projector operator associated with this state is
Pˆentangled = (| ↑〉| ↓〉 − | ↓〉| ↑〉)(〈↑ |〈↓ | − 〈↓ |〈↑ |) (97)
However, the projection operator Pˆentangled is not the same as the projection operator Pˆud ∨ Pˆdu where
Pˆud := (| ↑〉| ↓〉)(〈↓ |〈↑ |) and Pˆdu := (| ↓〉| ↑〉)(〈↑ |〈↓ |). This implies that Pˆentangled 6= Pˆud ∨ Pˆdu.
When translated to the history situation, this implies that a projection operator onto an entangled
state in H1 ⊗ H2, cannot be viewed as being an inhomogeneous history proposition: it is something
different. The precise temporal-logic meaning, if any, of these entangled projectors remains to be seen.
6 Topos formulation of the HPO formalism
6.1 Direct product of truth values
We are now interested in defining truth values for history propositions. In single-time topos quantum
theory, truth values are assigned through the evaluation map, which is a state-dependent map from the
algebra of history propositions to the Heyting algebra of truth values. In the history case, for this map
to be well-defined it has to map the temporal structure of the Heyting algebras of subobjects to some
temporal structure of the algebras of truth values. In the following section we will analyse how this
mapping takes place.
Let us consider a homogeneous history proposition αˆ = “the quantity A1 has a value in ∆1 at time
t1, and then the quantity A2 has a value in ∆2 at time t1 = 2, and then . . . and then the quantity An
has a value in ∆n at time tn’. Symbolically, we can write α as
α = (A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ (An ∈ ∆n)tn (98)
where the symbol ‘⊓’ is the temporal connective ‘and then’.
In the HPO formalism, α is represented by a tensor product of the spectral projection operators,
Eˆ[Ak ∈ ∆k] associated with each single-time proposition “Ak ∈ ∆k”, k = 1, 2, . . . , n:
αˆ = Eˆ[A1 ∈ ∆1]t1 ⊗ Eˆ[A2 ∈ ∆2]t2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eˆ[An ∈ ∆n]tn (99)
We will return later to the role in topos theory of this HPO representation of histories.
In order to ascribe a topos truth value to the homogeneous history α, we will first consider the truth
values of the individual, single-time propositions “(A1 ∈ ∆1)t1”, “(A2 ∈ ∆2)t2”, . . . , “(An ∈ ∆n)tn”.
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These truth values are elements of ΓΩHtk , k = 1, 2, . . . , n: i.e., global sections of the subobject classifier
in the appropriate topos, SetsV(Htk )
op
. We will analyse how these truth values can be combined to obtain
a truth value for the entire history proposition α. For the sake of simplicity we will restrict ourselves to
two-time propositions, but the extension to n-time slots is trivial.
Since there is no state-vector reduction, one can hope to define the truth value of the entire history
α := (A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 in terms of the truth values of the individual propositions at times t1
and t2. In particular, since we are conjecturing that the truth values at the two times are independent
of each other, we expect an equation something like that13
v
(
(A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 ; |ψ〉t1
)
= v
(
A1 ∈ ∆1; |ψ〉t1
)
⊓ v
(
A2 ∈ ∆2; |ψ〉t2
)
(100)
where |ψ〉t2 is the unitary evolution of |ψ〉t2 . The ‘⊓’ on the right hand side remains to be defined as
some sort of temporal connective on the Heyting algebras SetsV(Ht1 )
op
and SetsV(Ht1 )
op
.
However, at this point we hit the problem that v
(
A1 ∈ ∆1; |ψ〉t1
)
and v
(
A2 ∈ ∆2; |ψ〉t2
)
are global
elements of the subobject classifiers ΩHt1 and ΩHt2 in the topoi SetsV(Ht1 )
op
and SetsV(Ht2)
op
respec-
tively. Since these topoi are different from each other, it is not obvious how the the ‘⊓’ operation on the
right hand side of equation (100) is to be defined.
On the other hand, since ΓΩHt1 and ΓΩHt2 are Heyting algebras, we can take their tensor product
ΓΩHt1 ⊗ ΓΩHt2 . By analogy with what we did earlier with the Heyting algebras of subobjects of the
spectral presheaves, it is natural to interpret the ‘⊓’ on the right hand side of equation (100) as this
tensor product, so that we end up with the plausible looking equation
v
(
(A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 ; |ψ〉t1
)
= v
(
A1 ∈ ∆1; |ψ〉t1
)
⊗ v
(
A2 ∈ ∆2; |ψ〉t2
)
(101)
The problem now is to find a topos for which the Heyting algebra ΓΩHt1 ⊗ΓΩHt2 is well defined. This
is reminiscent of the problem we encountered earlier when trying to represent inhomogeneous histories in
a topos, and the answer is the same: pull everything back to the intermediate topos Sets(V(Ht1 )×V(Ht2))
op
.
Specifically, let us define
ΩHt1 × ΩHt2 := p∗1(Ω
Ht1 )× p∗2(Ω
Ht2 ) (102)
which is an object in Sets(V(Ht1 )×V(Ht2))
op
. In fact, it is easy to check that it is the subobject classifier
in the intermediate topos, and is defined at stage 〈V1, V2〉 ∈ Ob(V(Ht1)× V(Ht2)) by
(ΩHt1 × ΩHt2 )〈V1,V2〉 := Ω
Ht1
V1
× Ω
Ht2
V2
(103)
and we have the important result that there is an isomorphism
j : ΓΩHt1 ⊗ΓΩHt2 → Γ(ΩHt1 ×ΩHt2 ) := Γ
(
p∗1(Ω
Ht1 )× p∗2(Ω
Ht2 )
)
≃ Γ
(
p∗1(Ω
Ht1 )
)
×Γ
(
p∗2(Ω
Ht2 )
)
(104)
given by
j(ω1 ⊗ ω2)(〈V1, V2〉) := 〈ω1(V1), ω2(V2)〉 (105)
13Since there is no state-vector reduction the existence of an operation ⊓ between truth values , that satisfies equation
(100) is plausible. In fact, unlike the normal logical connective ‘∧’, the meaning of the temporal connective ‘⊓’ implies
that the propositions it connects do not ‘interfere’ with each other since they are asserted at different times: it is thus a
sensible first guess to assume that their truth values are independent.
The distinction between the temporal connective ‘⊓’ and the logical connective ‘∧’ is discussed in details in various
papers by Stachow and Mittelstaedt [33] ,[32], [29], [30]. In these papers they analyse quantum logic using the ideas of
game theory. In particular they define logical connectives in terms of sequences of subsequent moves of possible attacks
and defenses. They also introduce the concept of ‘commensurability property’ which essentially defines the possibility of
quantities being measured at the same time or not. The definition of logical connectives involves both possible attacks
and defenses as well as the satisfaction of the commensurability property since logical connective relate propositions which
refer to the same time. On the other hand, the definition of sequential connectives does not need the introduction of
the commensurability properties since sequential connectives refer to propositions defined at different times, and thus can
always be evaluated together. The commensurability property introduced by Stachow and Mittelstaedt can be seen as the
game theory analogue of the commutation relation between operators in quantum theory. We note that the same type of
analysis can be applied as a justification of Isham’s choice of the tensor product as temporal connective in the HPO theory.
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The proof of this result is similar to that of Theorem 5.3 and will not be written out here.
For us, the significant implication of this result is that the truth value, v
(
(A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈
∆2)t2 ; |ψ〉t1
)
, of the history proposition (A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 can be regarded as an element of the
Heyting algebra Γ(ΩHt1 × ΩHt2 ) whose ‘home’ is the intermediate topos Sets(V(Ht1)×V(Ht2))
op
. Thus a
more accurate way of writing equation (101) is
v
(
(A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 ; |ψ〉t1
)
= j
(
v
(
A1 ∈ ∆1; |ψ〉t1
)
⊗ v
(
A2 ∈ ∆2; |ψ〉t2
))
(106)
6.2 The representation of HPO histories
In this Section we will pull together what has been said above in order to obtain a topos analogue of the
HPO formalism of quantum history theory.
First we recall that in the HPO formalism, a history proposition α = α1 ⊓ α2 is identified with the
tensor product of the projection operators αˆ1 and αˆ2 representing the single-time propositions α1 and
α2 respectively, i.e., αˆ = αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2. One main motivation for introducing the tensor product was a desire
to make sense of the negation operation of homogeneous history propositions, as given intuitively by
equation (7).
In fact, in the original approaches to consistent-histories theory the temporal connective ‘and then’
was simply associated to the operator product: thus the proposition α = α1 ⊓ α2 was represented by
αˆ = αˆ1αˆ2. But this identification loses any logical meaning since, given projection operators Pˆ and Qˆ
the product Pˆ Qˆ is generally not itself a projection operator.
However,, if one defines the sequential connective ⊓ in terms of the tensor product, such that α =
α1 ⊓ α2 is represented by αˆ = αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2, then αˆ is a projection operator. Furthermore, one obtains the
right definition for the negation operation specifically
¬(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2) = (¬αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2) + (αˆ1 ⊗ ¬αˆ2) + (¬αˆ1 ⊗ ¬αˆ2) (107)
where we identify + with ∨. 14
We will now precede by considering history propositions as defined by the HPO formalism as indi-
vidual entities and then apply the machinery defined in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and [10] to derive a topos
version of the history formalism. Thus (i) the ‘and then’, ⊓, on the right hand side of equation (100)
is represented by the tensor products of the Heyting algebras ΓΩHt1 and ΓΩHt2 (as in equation (101));
and (ii) the ‘and then’ on the left hand side of equation (100) will be represented initially by the tensor
product of the associated spectral projectors (i.e., using the HPO formalism) and then ‘daseinized’ to
become the tensor product between the Heyting algebras Sub(ΣHt1 ) and Sub(ΣHt2 )
We have argued in the previous Sections that (two-time) inhomogeneous history propositions can
be represented as subobjects of the spectral presheaf in the intermediate topos Sets(V(H1)×V(H2))
op
. In
particular, the homogeneous history α1⊓α2 is represented by the presheaf δ(αˆ1)⊗δ(αˆ2) ⊆ Σ
Ht1 ×ΣHt2 ≃
θ∗
(
ΣHt1 ⊗ΣHt2
)
. On the other hand, the HPO-representative, αˆ1⊗ αˆ2, belongs to Ht1 ⊗Ht2 and hence
its daseinization, δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2), is a subobject of the spectral presheaf Σ
Ht1⊗Ht2 , which is an object in
the topos SetsV(Ht1⊗Ht2 )
op
. As such, δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2) is defined at every stage in V(Ht1 ⊗ Ht2), including
entangled ones of the formW = V1⊗V2+V3⊗V4. However, since, by its very nature, the tensor product
δ(αˆ1) ⊗ δ(αˆ2) is defined only in the intermediate topos Sets
(V(Ht1)×V(Ht2))
op
, in order to compare it
with δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2) it is necessary to first pull-back the latter to the intermediate topos using the geometric
morphism θ∗. However, having done that, it is easy to prove that
θ∗
(
δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2)
)
〈V1,V2〉
= δ(αˆ1)
V1
⊗ δ(αˆ2)
V2
(108)
for all 〈V1, V2〉 ∈ V(Ht1)× V(Ht2). A marginally less accurate way of writing this equation is
δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2)V1⊗V2 = δ(αˆ1)V1
⊗ δ(αˆ2)
V2
(109)
14This is correct since the projectors which appear on the right hand side of the equation are pair-wise orthogonal, thus
the ‘or’, ∨, can be replaced by the summation operation + of projector operators.
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We need to be able to daseinize inhomogeneous histories as well as homogeneous ones, but fortunately
here we can exploit one of the important features of daseinization: namely, that it preserves the ‘∨’-
operation: i.e., at any stage V we have δ(Qˆ1 ∨ Qˆ2)V = δ(Qˆ1)V ∨ δ(Qˆ2)V . Thus, for an inhomogeneous
history of the form α := (α1 ⊓ α2) ∨ (β1 ⊓ β2) we have the topos representation
δ(αˆ) = δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2 ∨ βˆ1 ⊗ βˆ2)
= δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2) ∪ δ(βˆ1 ⊗ βˆ2) (110)
which, using equation (109), can be rewritten as
δ(αˆ)
V1⊗V2
= δ(αˆ1)
V1
⊗ δ(αˆ2)
V2
∪ δ(βˆ1)
V1
⊗ δ(βˆ2)
V2
(111)
This is an important result for us.
Let us now consider a specific two-time history α := (A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 and try to determine
its truth value in terms of the truth values of the single-time propositions of which it is composed. Let
the initial state be |ψ〉t1 ∈ Ht1 and let us first construct the truth value of the proposition “(A1 ∈ ∆1)t1”
(with associated spectral projector Eˆ[A1 ∈ ∆1]) in the state |ψ〉t1 . To do this we must construct the
pseudo-state associated with |ψ〉t1 . This is defined at each context V ∈ Ob(V(Ht1)) as
w
|ψ〉t1
V := δ
(
|ψ〉t1 t1〈ψ|
)
V
which form the components of the presheaf w |ψ〉t1 ⊆ ΣH1 . The truth value of the proposition “(A1 ∈
∆1)t1” at stage V1, given the pseudo-state w
|ψ〉t1 , is then the global element of ΩHt1 given by
v(A1 ∈ ∆1; |ψ〉t1)(V1) = {V
′ ⊆ V1 | w
|ψ〉t1
V ′ ⊆ δ(Eˆ[A1 ∈ ∆1])V ′} (112)
= {V ′ ⊆ V1 | t1〈ψ| δ
(
Eˆ[A1 ∈ ∆1]
)
V ′
|ψ〉t1 = 1} (113)
for all V1 ∈ Ob(V(Ht1)).
As there is no state-vector reduction in the topos quantum theory, the next step is to evolve the state
|ψ〉t1 to time t2 using the usual, unitary time-evolution operator Uˆ(t1, t2); thus |ψ〉t2 = Uˆ(t1, t2) |ψ〉t1 .
Of course, this vector still lies in Ht1 . However, in the spirit of the HPO formalism, we will take its
isomorphic copy (but still denoted |ψ〉t2) in the Hilbert space Ht2 ≃ Ht1 .
Now we consider the truth value of the proposition “(A2 ∈ ∆2)t2” in this evolved state |ψ〉t2 . To do
so we employ the pseudo-state
w
|ψ〉t2
V2
= w
Uˆ(t2,t1) |ψ〉t1
V2
= δ(|ψ〉t2 t2〈ψ| )V2
= δ
(
Uˆ(t2, t1)|ψ〉t1 t1〈ψ| Uˆ(t2, t1)
−1
)
V2
(114)
at all stages V2 ∈ Ob(V(H2)). Then the truth value of the proposition “(A2 ∈ ∆2)t2” (with associated
spectral projector Eˆ[A2 ∈ ∆2]) at stage V2 ∈ Ob(V(H2)) is
v
(
A2 ∈ ∆2; |ψ〉t2
)
(V2) = {V
′ ⊆ V2 | w
|ψ〉t2
V ′ ⊆ δ
(
Eˆ[A2 ∈ ∆2]
)
V ′
} (115)
= {V ′ ⊆ V2 | t2〈ψ| δ
(
Eˆ[A2 ∈ ∆2]
)
V ′
|ψ〉t2 = 1}
We would now like to define truth values of daseinized history propositions of the form δ(αˆ1 ⊗ αˆ2).
To do so we need to construct the appropriate pseudo states. A state in the tensor product Hilbert space
Ht1 ⊗Ht2 is represented by |ψ〉t1 ⊗ |ψ〉t2 where, for reasons explained above, |ψ〉t2 = Uˆ(t2, t1) |ψ〉t1 . To
each such tensor product of states, we can associate the tensor product pseudo-state:
w
|ψ〉t1⊗ |ψ〉t2 := δ
(
|ψt1 ⊗ ψt2〉〈ψt2 ⊗ ψt1 |
)
= δ
(
|ψ〉t1 t1〈ψ| ⊗ |ψ〉t2 t2〈ψ|
)
(116)
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On the other hand, for contexts V1 ⊗ V2 ∈ Ob(V(H1 ⊗H2)) we have
w
|ψ〉t1
V1
⊗w
|ψ〉t2
V2
= δ
(
|ψ〉t1 t1〈ψ|
)
V1
⊗ δ
(
|ψ〉t2 t2〈ψ|
)
V2
(117)
= δ
(
|ψ〉t1 t1〈ψ| ⊗ |ψ〉t2 t2〈ψ|
)
V1⊗V2
(118)
so that
w
|ψ〉t1
V1
⊗w
|ψ〉t2
V2
= w
|ψ〉t1⊗ |ψ〉t2
V1⊗V2
(119)
or, slightly more precisely
w
|ψ〉t1
V1
⊗w
|ψ〉t2
V2
= θ∗
(
w
|ψ〉t1⊗ |ψ〉t2
)
〈V1,V2〉
(120)
Given the pseudo-state w |ψ〉t1 ⊗ w |ψ〉t2 ∈ Subcl(Σ
Ht1 ) ⊗ Subcl(Σ
Ht2 ) we want to consider the truth
value of the subobjects of the form S1 ⊗ S2 (more precisely, of the homogeneous history proposition
represented by this subobject) as a global element of ΩHt1 × ΩHt2 . This is given by
v
(
w
|ψ〉t1 ⊗w |ψ〉t2 ⊆ S1 ⊗ S2
)(
〈V1, V2〉
)
:={〈V ′1 , V
′
2〉 ⊆ 〈V1, V2〉 |
(
p∗1(w
|ψ〉t1 )× p∗2(w
|ψ〉t2 )
)
〈V ′
1
,V ′
2
〉
⊆ (S1 × S2)〈V ′1 ,V ′2 〉}
≃ {V
′
1 ⊆ V1 | w
|ψ〉t1
V
′
1
⊆ (S1)V ′
1
} × {V
′
2 ⊆ V2 | w
|ψ〉t1
V
′
2
⊆ (S1)V ′
2
} (121)
=
〈
v
(
w
|ψ〉t1 ⊆ S1
)
(V1), v
(
w
|ψ〉t2 ⊆ S2
)
(V2)
〉
=j
(
v(w |ψ〉t1 ⊆ S1)⊗ v(w
|ψ〉t2 ⊆ S2)
)
(〈V1, V2〉) (122)
where j : ΓΩHt1 ⊗ ΓΩHt2 → Γ(ΩHt1 × ΩHt2 ) is discussed in equation (105). Thus we have
v
(
w
|ψ〉t1 ⊗w |ψ〉t2 ⊆ S1 ⊗ S2
)
= j
(
v(w |ψ〉t1 ⊆ S1)⊗ v(w
|ψ〉t2 ⊆ S2)
)
(123)
where the link with equation (100) is clear. In particular, for the homogenous history α := (A1 ∈
∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 we have the generalised truth value
v
(
(A1 ∈ ∆1)t1 ⊓ (A2 ∈ ∆2)t2 ; |ψ〉t1
)
= v
(
w
|ψ〉t1 ⊗w |ψ〉t2 ⊆ δ
(
Eˆ[A1 ∈ ∆1]
)
⊗ δ
(
Eˆ[A2 ∈ ∆2]
)
= j
(
v
(
w
|ψ〉t1 ⊆ δ
(
Eˆ[A1 ∈ ∆1]
)
⊗ v
(
w
|ψ〉t2 ⊆ δ
(
Eˆ[A2 ∈ ∆2]
))
(124)
This can be extended to inhomogeneous histories with the aid of equation (111).
The discussion above shows that Do¨ring-Isham topos scheme for quantum theory can be extended
to include propositions about the history of the system in time. A rather striking feature of the scheme
is the way that the tensor product of projectors used in the HPO history formalism is ‘reflected’ in the
existence of a tensor product between the Heyting algebras of sub-objects of the relevant presheaves.
Or, to put it another way, a type of ‘temporal logic’ of Heyting algebras can be constructed using the
definition of the Heyting-algebra tensor product.
As we have seen, the topos to use for all this is the ‘intermediate topos’ Sets(V(Ht1)×V(Ht2))
op
of
presheaves over the category V(Ht1) × V(Ht2). The all-important spectral presheaf in this topos is
essentially the presheaf ΣHt1⊗Ht2 in the topos SetsV(Ht1⊗Ht2)
op
but restricted to ‘product’ stages V1⊗V2
for V1 ∈ Ob(V(Ht1)) and V2 ∈ Ob(V(Ht2)). This restricted presheaf, can be understood as a ‘product’
ΣHt1 × ΣHt2 . A key result in this context is our proof in Theorem 5.3 of the existence of a Heyting
algebra isomorphism h : Sub(ΣHt1 )⊗ Sub(ΣHt2 )→ Sub(ΣHt1 × ΣHt2 ).
Moreover, as we showed, the evaluation map of history propositions maps the temporal structure of
history propositions to the temporal structure of truth values, in such a way that the temporal-logic
properties are preserved.
A fundamental feature of the topos analogue of the HPO formalism developed above is that the notion
of consistent sets, and thus of the decoherence functional, plays no role. In fact, as shown above, truth
values can be ascribed to any history proposition independently of whether it belongs to a consistent
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set or not. Ultimately, this is because the topos formulation of quantum theory makes no fundamental
use of the notion of probabilities, which are such a central notion in the (instrumentalist) Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory. Instead, the topos approach deals with ‘generalised’ truth values in
the Heyting algebra of global elements of the subobject classifier. This is the sense in which the theory
is ‘neo-realist’.
Reiterating, the standard consistent histories approach makes use of the Copenhagen concept of
probabilities which must satisfy the classical summation rules and thus can only be applied to “classical”
sets of histories i.e., consistent sets of histories defined using the decoherence functional. The topos
formulation of the HPO formalism abandons the concept of probabilities and replaces them with truth
values defined at particular stages: i.e., abelian Von Neumann subalgebras. These stages are interpreted
as the classical snapshots of the theory. In this framework there is no need for the notion of consistent set
and, consequently, of decoherence functional. Thus the topos formulation of consistent histories avoids
the issue of having many incompatible, consistent sets of proposition, and can assign truth values to any
history proposition.
It is interesting to note that in the consistent history formulation of classical physics we do not have
the notion of decoherence functional since, in this case, no history interferes with any other. Since, as
previously stated, one of the aims of re-expressing quantum theory in terms of topos theory was to make
it “look like” classical physics, it would seem that, at lease as far as the notion of decoherence functional
is involved, the resemblance has been demonstrated successfully.
7 Conclusions and Outlook
The consistent histories interpretation of quantum theory was born in the light of making sense of
quantum theory as applied to a closed system. A central ingredient in the consistent-histories approach
is the notion of the decoherence functional which defines consistent sets of propositions, i.e., propositions
which do not interfere with each other. Only within these consistent sets can the Copenhagen notion of
probabilities be applied. Thus, only within a given consistent set is it possible to use quantum theory
to analyze a closed system. Unfortunately, there are many incompatible consistent sets of propositions,
which can not be grouped together to form a larger set. This feature causes several problems in the
consistent histories approach since it is not clear how to interpret this plethora of consistent sets or how
to select a specific one, if needed.
In standard quantum theory, the problem is overcome by the existence of an external observer who
selects what observable to measure. This is not possible when dealing with a closed system since, in this
case, there is no notion of external observer.
As mentioned in the Introduction several attempts have been made to interpret this plethora of
consistent sets, including one by Isham [23] that used topos theory albeit in a very different way from
the present paper. Rather, in this paper, we derive a formalism for analyzing history propositions, which
does not require the notion of consistent sets, thus avoiding the problem of incompatible sets from the
outset. In particular we adopt the topos formulation of quantum theory put forward by Isham and Do¨ring
in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and [10] and apply it to situations in which the propositions, to be evaluated, are
temporally-ordered propositions, i.e., history propositions. In the above mentioned papers, the authors
only define truth values for single time propositions, but we have extended their schema to sequences
of propositions defined at different times. In particular we have shown how to define truth values of
homogeneous history propositions in terms of the truth values of their individual components. In order
to achieve this we exploit the fact that, in the histories approach, there is no state-vector reduction
induced by measurement, since we are in the context of a closed system. We take the absence of state-
vector reduction to imply that truth values of propositions at different times do not ‘interfere’ with each
other, so that it is reasonable to try to define truth values of the composite proposition in terms of the
truth values of the individual, single-time propositions.
In the setting of topos theory, propositions are identified with subobject of the spectral presheaf. We
showed that for (the example of two-time) history propositions the correct topos to utilize is the ‘in-
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termediate topos’ Sets(V(Ht1 )×V(Ht2))
op
≃ θ∗
(
SetsV(H1⊗H2)
op)
whose category of contexts only contains
pure tensor products of abelian von Neumann subalgebras.
The reason that such this topos was chosen instead of the full topos SetsV(H1⊗H2) is because of its
relation to the tensor product, Sub(ΣHt1 )⊗ Sub(ΣHt2 ), of Heyting algebras Sub(ΣHt1 ) and Sub(ΣHt2 )
However, the full topos is interesting as there are entangled contexts, i.e., contexts which are not pure
tensor products. For such contexts it is impossible to define a history proposition as a temporally-
ordered proposition, or a logical ‘or’ of such. Moreover, in our formalism, because of the absence of
state-vector reduction, the truth value of a proposition at a given time does not influence the truth value
of a proposition at a later time as long as the states in terms of which such truth values are defined are
the evolution (through the evolution operator) of the same states at different times. These means that
the pseudo-states at different times are related in a causal way.
To analyse in details the dependence between history propositions and individual time components,
we introduced the notion of temporal logic in the context of Heyting algebras. Specifically we identified
the temporal structure of the Heyting algebra of propositions θ∗
(
Sub(ΣHt1⊗Ht2 )
)
in terms of the tensor
product of Heyting algebras of single-time propositions Sub(ΣHt1 ) ⊗ Sub(ΣHt2 ), i.e. we show that the
two algebras are isomorphic. We were than able to define an evaluation map within the intermediate
topos Sets(V(Ht1)×V(Ht2 ))
op
and show that such a map correctly preserve the temporal structure of the
history propositions it evaluates.
There are still a number of open questions that need to be addressed. In particular it would be very
important to analyse the precise temporal-logical meaning, if there is one, of entangled inhomogeneous
propositions, and thus extend the topos formalism of history theory to the full topos SetsV(Ht1⊗Ht2 )
op
.
Such an extension would be useful since it would shed light on composite systems in general in the
context of topos theory: something that is still missing.
The topos-centered history formalism developed in the present paper does not require the notion of
consistent sets. However, in standard consistent-history theory, the importance of consistent sets lies in
the fact that, given such a set, the formalism can be interpreted as saying that it is ‘as if’ the quantum
state has undergone a state-vector reduction. This phenomenon allows for predictions of events in a
closed system, i.e., the assignment of probabilities to the possible outcomes.
Given the importance of such consistent sets, their absence in the topos formulation of the history
formalism is striking. It would thus be interesting to investigate the possibility of re-introducing the
notion of decoherence functional and thus of consistent sets.
Since the decoherence functional assigns probabilities to histories, a related issue is that of defining
the notion of a probability within the topos formulation of history theory. The introduction of such
probabilities would allow us to assign truth values to ‘second-level propositions’, i.e., propositions of the
form ”the probability of the history α being true is p”. This type of proposition is precisely of the form
dealt with in [23].
Another interesting topic for further investigation would be the connection, if any, with the path
integral formulation of history theory. In fact, in a recent work by A. Do¨ering, [11] it was shown that
it is possible to define a measure within a topos. A very interesting new research programme would be
to analyze whether such a measure can be used in the context of the topos formulation of consistent
histories developed in the present paper to recover the path-integral formulation of standard quantum
theory. This analysis would require the definition of probabilities different from one discussed above,
since the path integral was introduced precisely to define the decoherence functional between histories.
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